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ne hears everywhere these days the accusation that “austerity is killing growth in 
Europe”! What austerity? Deficits have been reduced on average by about 1% of 
GDP in the euro area over the last three years (bringing the deficit from 6% of GDP 
in 2009 to 3% of GDP this year). The pace of deficit reduction has actually been equally 
gradual in the UK (which is often cited as a prime example of ‘savage budget cuts’) and the 
US. In both countries the deficit was reduced over the same time period from 11 to 8% of 
GDP. The image of a German-imposed austerity in Europe is thus plain false. 
Of course, even a (de facto gradual) reduction in deficits could be killing growth ‘softly’. But 
this does not seem to have been the case so far, especially if one sets today’s austerity in the 
context of the huge fiscal expansion that preceded it. One cannot talk about the costs of 
cutting deficits without taking into account the entire cycle.  
If one looks at the entire budget cycle, the picture of austerity killing growth does not hold 
up. Since the bursting of the bubble in 2007, the economic performance of the US has been 
very similar to that of the euro area: GDP per capita is today about 2% below the 2007 level 
on both sides of the Atlantic; and the unemployment rate has increased by about the same 
amount as well: it increased by 3% both in the US and the euro area.  
Over a five-year period, the US has thus not done any better than the euro area although it 
has  used  a  much  larger  dose  of  fiscal  expansion.  In  the  US  (and  the  UK),  the  general 
government deficit is today still around 8%, compared to a little over 3% of GDP in the euro 
area.  
Ironically, the economy with the strongest dose of expansionary policy (both monetary and 
fiscal) is also the one where growth (measured by GDP per capita) has been the weakest 
since GDP per capita in the UK is today 6% below the 2007 level. Of course, one could argue 
that the UK was particularly exposed to the bust because financial services make up a large 
part of its GDP. However, it still remains true that its economy, which is supposed to be the 
most flexible in Europe, has not recovered from the shock five years later despite massive 
doses of expansionary fiscal and monetary policy coupled with a devaluation. 
Given the massive negative shock coming from the tensions in the sovereign debt markets, it 
is  likely  that  the  relative  performance  of  the  euro  area  will  deteriorate  this  year.  So  far, 
however, it does not seem that austerity had a strong negative impact on growth in Europe.  
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One  can  of  course  point  to  particular  countries  in  Europe  where  austerity  has  led  to  a 
depression. But the US has also pockets of very depressed areas. For Ireland and Spain, read 
Nevada and California (and for Greece, read Puerto Rico). The proper comparison is thus 
between  two  continental-sized  economies,  both  of  which  harbour  considerable  diversity. 
Moreover, the shock from the financial crisis should have been comparable for the US and 
the euro area since housing prices had increased (on average) by about the same amount and 
the expansion of leverage in the financial system had also been similar. 
Prominent economists such as Paul Krugman and Richard Layard have recently pleaded: 
“Stop  this  austerity  now.”  But  “this  austerity”  consists  of  a  rather  gradual  reduction  in 
deficits, which, at its present pace, would get the US and the UK only by 2017 back to the 
point where they started in 2007 (still a deficit of close to 3% of GDP).  
It is certainly true that the evidence shows that austerity is not expansionary. And Krugman 
and Layard are also correct in pointing out that when private demand started to collapse in 
2008, public demand had to be stepped up to prevent the Great Recession from becoming a 
second  Depression.  But  four  years  later,  some  retrenchment  of  the  public  sector  is 
unavoidable as public debt ratios become unsustainable – even if “this austerity” implies a 
temporary loss of employment and output. The fact that austerity does have costs does not 
imply it should never be undertaken. Rather, the results from the ‘Great Response’ to the 
Great  Recession,  which  involved  first  considerable  fiscal  expansion  and  then  gradual 
retrenchment, suggest that the benefits from deficit spending were smaller than expected, 
and  possibly  smaller  than  the  cost  of  the  austerity  needed  to  bring  deficits  back  under 
control.  